Nov. Krieg, Flucht, Zukunftsängste: Irakische Jugendliche der Generation sind damit groß geworden. Von den Zuständen in ihrer Heimat sind. Bandgeschichte. Generation , o. J. Graz Erstbesetzung /67 : Bernhard Schüttengruber: Schlagzeug Heinrich Kusch: Gesang, Gitarre. Dez. Generation Die Stars von morgen. Sein Blick ist leer, die Stimme hört sich bedrückt an. Jann-Fiete Arp steht im Teamhotel in Indien vor.
Crisis Group observations, Najaf, September Hide Footnote Charitable entities connected to party figures have proliferated in the south. Ostensibly set up to address the large influx of Sunni displaced IDPs or conduct other civil-society activity, they have direct access to international aid, mostly from UN agencies.
Crisis Group Skype interview, 10 June Hide Footnote They redirect part of this to sustain party patronage networks of individuals, families and tribes the state budget had financed and families of militia volunteers linked to the party they support.
Now is the time of civil society organisations. In alone, 70 new ones have been established in Karbala. Crisis Group Skype interview, 29 May Poor demographic data complicate the auditing and evaluation of these projects.
Crisis Group Skype interview, 27 May Yet, overall, parties lack flexibility to reach large numbers of youths. The familiar channels, party offices, co-option of tribal leaders and leverage over local and central state institutions, are no longer effective.
Police and other public-sector employees joined different hashd factions while continuing to receive government salaries.
Crisis Group observations, Karbala, July Hide Footnote Fundraising campaigns can only temporarily cover arms, salaries and benefits.
Efforts to attract recruits have exhausted resources and fragmented each main Shiite political party by making their leaders more dependent on external supplies of arms and funding raised through donors.
Hide Footnote This has largely resulted in the crumbling of traditional parties and empowerment of those party figures who secured local control through their affiliated militias and accumulated economic assets via their affiliated charities.
Militias began to splinter as well. For example, a struggle unfolded within the Daawa party, with Maliki, ousted as prime minister after IS captured Mosul and other cities, attempting a comeback by backing one of the militias.
Even the Sadrist movement, which has mobilised thousands of youths since , has failed to keep full support in its Sadr City stronghold now that it is part of the political establishment.
Our former fighters are 30; they have families and children and are no longer inclined to heroism and adventure. Crisis Group interview, Sadr City, 7 April Hosham al-Thahabi, an ex-Sadrist militant, commented: The Sadrist forces are poorly managed; defections are accelerating, and new militias acting independently from Sadr are appearing.
This is bad news, because Sadrist constituents make up the largest recruitment pool for all militias. The militias promise swift promotions and responsibilities, allowing recruits to express their identity in ways unimaginable in the army, police or Shiite parties and so boost their social standing in their home areas.
In contrast to middle-age Green Zone politicians in suits and ties, the militias promote a new generation of military and religious leaders with whom young Iraqis can identify.
Crisis Group observation, Karbala, July A young man from Sadr City observed: Sadr City boys like to peel off their eyebrows, apply tattoos and wear tight trousers.
Crisis Group interview, Baghdad, 26 July For us, supporters of the marjawi, the hashd is only a temporary project; it should reintegrate into the state, obtain funding only from the defence ministry and operate under the prime minister as a future National Guard, a force with power and training similar to the federal police.
For the supporters of the walayi, the hashd should be a force that can be deployed in Syria or anywhere else where it is needed.
As the hashd evolved into a forum for intra-Shiite political competition, each faction developed its own icons, symbols and names, complicating any government effort to merge them under a single command within the state.
With the government unable to produce an alternative plan for youth, the struggle against IS dragging on and provincial elections anticipated in April , militias leaders and politicians supporting them may leverage external financial and military support to consolidate their power and undermine the Abadi government.
We have a project of building a state. We want to reform state institutions and transform the hashd into a civilian hashd hashd al-shaabi al-madani.
Crisis Group interview, Basra, 28 September Hide Footnote Rather than producing a managed decentralisation, this development is handing extensive powers to local bosses without any central government oversight.
Mobilising youth became equally vital for Sunni provincial and tribal leaders intent on countering IS. Without direct access to weapons, they had to give lists of fighters to the national security organisation in Baghdad or Kurdish parties in Erbil so as to claim funds and arms.
Unlike at the time of the U. IS military successes exposed them as persons with no anchor in their own societies and no authority over Sunni areas.
They never led but rather fled the Sunni uprising. Once protests began in and IS advanced, Sunni leaders moved to safer ground Baghdad, Erbil, Amman , providing additional evidence to constituents of their self-serving policy.
Their cooperation with Kurdish or Shiite militias, which they had condemned for years, undermined their legitimacy even more.
Why he did not warn us? He accused the army so as to blame all on Maliki. He just used us! A Falluja resident living under IS expressed similar feelings: They went to various countries, including Iran, to increase their fortunes and sell them out.
Crisis Group telephone interview, 20 June Hide Footnote Away from IS-controlled territory, provincial officials and tribal leaders could rely only on a limited number of individuals who benefited from their patronage eg, senior police or close family ayyan al-ashira.
Sheikh Ahmad al-Jibouri, a former sahwa member, noted: In , I recruited more than 6, fighters and cleaned al-Doura [a Baghdad neighbourhood] of al-Qaeda.
Sunni recruitment to the hashd is a masquerade! Some tribal leaders, who promise to deliver a certain number of fighters, submit names to the government only to obtain funds, then flee to Amman.
Once safe, Sunni leaders made little effort to assist those living under IS. Instead, like Shiite politicians, they have tried to rebuild patronage networks via externally-funded charities for IDPs, who need guarantors to access safer areas, obtain documents enabling them to resettle and obtain services in the areas of their displacement.
These leaders hope outside powers will restore them to their old positions when IS is driven out — as a reward for not joining — and allow them to lead internationally-funded reconstruction.
On the other side of the front line, IS took advantage of the generational divide. As soon as it controlled a territory, it assigned responsibilities to local youths, recruiting them as fighters or giving those with low-ranking jobs a path to reach positions previously reserved for party members.
When IS arrived, senior party figures fled, and IS promoted young, low-ranking employees. Crisis Group, telephone interview, al-Qaim resident, 20 June Hide Footnote One of its most effective policies was to give leadership posts to the youngest members of a tribe aligned with the government.
Ramadi, which IS captured in June , is an example. Its central districts resisted until elders of the Abu Alwan tribe fled to Baghdad, leaving younger members in charge.
The latter struck a deal with IS, which included a general amnesty and their elevation to tribal chiefs. There is a new generation of sheikhs in Anbar.
Crisis Group telephone interview, al-Qaim resident, 29 July The post-IS phase in Sunni areas will be especially challenging, because social hierarchies are developing under IS rule that are parallel with and disconnected from those in areas under government control.
The two will be difficult to reconcile. Tribal leaders empowered by IS may be unwilling to step down and could challenge both Sunni political officials and the legitimacy of tribal elders.
This, and because they may be vulnerable to retributive violence, might provoke new generational power struggles within tribes.
National leaders will need to devise a non-discriminatory policy that targets youths in areas recovered from IS and prevents a Sunni leadership struggle that would exacerbate the generational divide.
Otherwise, people will face a stark choice between collaborators with IS and a discredited political clique that out-sourced recovery of Sunni areas to the hashd or the Kurds and intends to use reconstruction funds to rebuild its local support.
Rather than devise a policy that might spare a new generation another conflict, the Shiite political class has attempted to use the hashd movement to contain discontent among Shiite youths and redirect it toward the confrontation with IS.
Throughout , hashd factions sought to absorb the growing numbers of volunteers without affecting military operations by creating reserve forces qwwat ihtiyatiya that gave students and day workers basic training but often made no other use of them.
Under severe financial pressure, the government focused spending on youth mobilisation against IS, diverting it from jobs creation and other purposes.
In June , for the first time in a decade, ministries did not post new openings and have posted few since. Party disinvestment from state institutions was apparent.
An employee of the higher education ministry observed: IS successes have deepened the divide between them and destitute youths empowered by militias.
We tolerated many things after , but we reached saturation point. After [the IS conflict], I decided to leave in order to complete my studies abroad.
Here I have only a 20 per cent possibility to succeed in what I am doing compared to the previous generation, and we are no longer respected in this society.
Government policy coupled with the economic crisis have helped further marginalise the middle class. In areas the government controls, its fading ability to enforce the law in a militia-dominated environment compels young professionals to ask militias for protection.
It has attempted to relocate those institutions to areas controlled by Baghdad or the Kurds, but professors and students have difficulty accessing the new sites due to movement restrictions and fear of retaliation.
Students displaced in Baghdad cannot easily access Kirkuk due to restrictions imposed by the Kurdish regional government. Crisis Group interview, Baghdad, 20 July Hide Footnote In government-controlled areas, corruption that preceded the IS conflict has become even more rampant.
Students who join the hashd are often allowed to move up a grade in school despite having failed their exams or stayed away from school, while the most prestigious colleges now have admission quotas reserved for private-school students regardless of their marks.
A young doctor said admission to the College of Medicine required a high school grade of and that the higher education ministry has smoothed admission criteria by allocating a 10 per cent quota for students who did not reach that level, enabling a number of them to use personal connections to gain entry.
Crisis Group telephone interview, 20 October As a result, a perception has grown among medical and engineering students that they can escape the destructive cycle only by leaving.
The pattern of flight resembled that of militia mobilisation: But these professionals particularly doctors face special challenges.
Those trying to leave IS-controlled areas often must pay smugglers heavily. Faced with a massive brain drain, the government has tried to make it difficult for young graduates to obtain the original copy of their diploma, which they need to prove their degree and practice abroad.
Crisis Group interviews, Adhamiya hospital, Baghdad, 25 July Hide Footnote The protests were quickly replicated across the south and in Baghdad under the slogan of fighting corruption fasaad and demanding political reform islah.
Though the protests were in majority-Shiite areas, they assumed a kaleidoscopic rather than sectarian character, reflecting the rich diversity of society.
Protesters hailed from different class backgrounds, raising community symbols alongside nationalist ones. We are for reform: It has been fifteen years now with these same people.
We should have popular committees instead of parliament, or a prime minister without a parliament, or a technocratic cabinet.
I am not sure what the right formula is. I only know that we should start from scratch. Like Sunni protests two years earlier, the inchoate nature of demands for radical change created room for radical politicians to capitalise and take charge.
Youths found in the new movement a platform for expression more than an avenue for political participation and change. Its hybrid identity made it easy to manipulate.
The first to step into the vacuum in August were some Shiite militias that had led the fight against IS; with battlefield experience, they presented themselves as potent challengers to the faltering Abadi government.
The country might have slid into chaos or a militia-led coup except for a second intervention by Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who expressed support for Abadi if he carried out important reforms, including replacing his cabinet with unaffiliated technocrats.
Hide Footnote This was but a stop-gap, however, and quieted things only temporarily. Weak within his Daawa party and unable to gain support from other blocs, Abadi failed to join the energies unleashed in the streets to his broader reform agenda.
Embodying the ruling system, the political class was incapable of effecting genuine reform. The parties dominating the parliament could not agree on replacing ministers with technocrats, however.
In February , his political bloc, al-Ahrar Liberals , took charge of the protest movement. For three months, he commanded the street. On 30 April, they scaled the walls and broke into parliament and the council of ministers.
Sadr turned the street into a dynamic variable in politics, even a risky one vulnerable to misuse. Appeals for reform quickly became a populist call for the end of the entire political establishment and framework.
Yet, his actions seemed mainly to benefit his own bloc in its bargaining with other Shiite parties. Hide Footnote They consolidated polarisation between mobilised youth and elites rather than building a bridge to overcome deep social rifts.
While the agendas may differ, they have recruited directly within localities neighbourhood or village ; provided a sense of belonging to a collective inspired by ideals IS: The government and political parties have been unable to reproduce successful mobilisation and social mobility in their structures.
Bewildered and in disarray, the political establishment appears to have opted for a default strategy, counting on the cost of prolonged conflict becoming so high that it may yet recoup some of its legitimacy.
Crisis Group Skype interview, 28 October Hide Footnote Sunni leaders waiting for IS defeat, hope to regain power and standing in their communities for lack of a better alternative.
And what will happen with the many young fighters once their combat role ends? Speaking from experience, an ex-Mahdi army fighter said: Once the [IS] fight is over, what will we do with those who have become used to fighting?
They will blackmail society and claim this is their victory, that they have defended our houses, our families. They will keep their weapons and feel they are above the law.
The government may have no choice but to fight them. The conflict against IS has reshuffled social hierarchies and empowered and legitimised new leaders, creating a fresh reality with which the political class will have to contend sooner or later.
In Sunni-populated areas, establishment politicians could try to regain legitimacy by distributing foreign aid and engaging local youths in reconstruction, but this is likely to resurrect the very patron-client relationships that proved unsustainable after the U.
And if they fail to engage young people beyond the patronage networks, they will be strongly resisted by commanders who fought for IS and could thus recoup a measure of local support.
Shiite militia commanders and political figures supporting them, such as Maliki or Hadi al-Ameri, the foremost militia commander, could try to capitalise on the popularity they gained in fighting IS to bid for political power and turn their young fighters into supporters in future elections.
Lack of agility in adjusting to rapid change has enabled a cycle of escalating conflict that could precipitate political class demise.
By calling youths to join street protests while blocking parliament from convening and legislating reforms in May, Sadr already exacerbated the divide between the street and political elites without providing a workable alternative.
Young people whose anti-establishment sentiments are being directed toward opposite poles of a sectarian agenda might become even more susceptible to crass political manipulation by actors intent on fuelling domestic and regional conflicts.
Shiite youths have proved a critical resource for Iran, which has recruited them to fight its war in Syria, where one of its principal enemies is IS, which has a significant Iraqi component in both leadership and rank and file.
As fighters or emigrants, Generation could become a transnational challenge. Any post-IS reconstruction and stabilisation campaign, even if implemented locally, requires a national vision for addressing the youth problem and a multiyear plan that targets this age group.
Offering youth a clear direction is a greater priority than merely providing funds and jobs. Until now, the government has used state legitimacy and institutional benefits to boost a mobilisation into militias it did not call for and could neither prevent nor control, and which is undermining state institutions.
It should do the opposite: This would involve refocusing hashd neighbourhood-based recruitment centres from defence to local governance, thus filling a gap left by local authorities who have failed to provide adequate services or security.
Such an effort could resonate with fighters who profess political aspirations. It might allow Iran to preserve its interests in southern provinces, while giving the central government a measure of leverage against it.
Local leaders should engage youths directly in reconstruction, regardless of tribal affiliation or who fought with or against IS.
International institutions that manage financial and development support for Iraq, such as the IMF, the World Bank and UN agencies, should consider whether to revise their approach.
The current vacuum sucks youths into one of three directions: The issue is not one of youth radicalisation, as conventional wisdom suggests.
Hide Footnote Young Iraqis are not radicalised so much as recruited into organisations that provide community and direction, regardless of ideology.
A fresh, state-based, internationally-backed approach by the Abadi government aimed at reconnecting young people to the society in which they live and breathe is the best formula to prevent destructive exploitation.
The Stockholm Agreement, though imprecise, offers a real shot at building a peace process for war-ravaged Yemen. But the accord is faltering amid mutual recriminations.
The UN, and the wider international community, should act now to make sure the combatants follow through on their commitments. At UN-mediated talks in Sweden, the two parties announced what is now known as the Stockholm Agreement.
You can read our analysis of the agreement here , but its key components were a prisoner swap, an agreement for mutual redeployments from Hodeida — the port, the city and environs — and a commitment to discuss de-escalation at another front-line city, Taiz.
The Hodeida agreement in particular was vital. A battle around this Red Sea port threatened to cut off a trade route that accounts for 70 per cent of key goods shipped into Yemen, thereby pushing the country into famine.
A month on, the momentum behind the Stockholm Agreement is flagging as the rivals exchange mutual recriminations and the UN struggles to get them to follow through on their pledges to redeploy from Hodeida.
With the deadline for redeployments now past — they were scheduled for completion by 8 January — speculation is mounting that the deal may be on the verge of collapse.
The Stockholm Agreement is imperfect and imprecise, but it was hard-won. If it is allowed to break down, there will be no opportunity for a similar deal for a long time.
Here are five steps the UN, and the wider international community, should urgently take to safeguard the accord and move its provisions forward.
The Yemeni government claims that the Huthis have violated a ceasefire announced on 18 December hundreds of times. The Huthis have made similar claims about their adversaries.
Given the nature of the forces of the ground, and the fact that the Stockholm Agreement does not include any definition of the ceasefire, little more can be expected for the time being.
More worrying are the ongoing provocations of the Huthis in particular, and the rapidly escalating war of words among the Huthis, the government, the Saudi-led coalition and their various media proxies.
On 29 December, after an abortive UN attempt to get the parties to temporarily reopen the Sanaa-Hodeida road as part of a confidence-building measure, the Huthis unilaterally announced their redeployment from Red Sea ports, reportedly refusing to allow a UN convoy to leave the city via the Sanaa road.
It was a disingenuous announcement. Cammaert refused to oblige. The Huthis then boycotted an 8 January meeting of the Redeployment Coordination Committee, the body chaired by Cammaert and tasked with agreeing on how to manage force redeployments from in and around Hodeida.
They cited security concerns, arguing that the meeting would have taken place in territory controlled by their adversaries.
The Yemeni government argued that the claim was spurious, given that their representatives had crossed the front lines to meet the Huthis in territory they controlled on two previous occasions.
Cammaert subsequently met with the Yemeni government and the Huthis at separate locations. Confidence declined further after a series of Huthi attacks on high-profile targets far from Hodeida, including a United Arab Emirates UAE base in Mokha hit by a Huthi missile , a Yemeni government-run military facility in Lahj governorate and sites inside Saudi Arabia.
At the same time, the Saudi-led coalition has ratcheted up its rhetoric in what many believe is preparation for a return to hostilities.
It is also allegedly bulking up its forces at key positions on the Red Sea coast, including Mokha. While not all these actions are violations of the ceasefire agreement in many cases, the Huthi attacks occurred outside its geographic scope , they are highly provocative.
The UN and the wider international community should press each side to immediately halt moves that seem designed to provoke the other to walk away from the agreement.
They also need to start implementing the accord, which will require securing greater cooperation from the Huthis first and foremost more on how to do this below.
After the Sweden talks, the UN was forced to hastily organise a truce in Hodeida governorate that started on 18 December. But the parties did not agree to ground rules.
Unlike most ceasefire agreements, this one did not include technical details on the scope, nature or duration of the halt to hostilities; definition of breaches; or mechanisms for quickly stopping fighting if it breaks out anew.
Failure to achieve such an agreement — in all likelihood due to the urgency of getting a deal — has had damaging consequences.
So far, the UN has argued that the post-Stockholm gunfire and shelling are relatively minor breaches, and that neither side has attempted to take new ground, which would be a grave infraction.
But the government has accused the Huthis of erecting barricades across Hodeida while the rebels have alleged that coalition troop build-ups are occurring around the city and further down the Red Sea coast.
Both claims, which would violate the spirit if not the letter of the Stockholm Agreement, appear credible. The UN deployed a team in December to assess the situation in Hodeida, monitor it as best possible and start talks between rival commanders over redeployments.
But to date the team has been unable to adjudicate the ceasefire or gauge the level of adherence to the deal. Doing so will require a clear set of rules governing the ceasefire, along with detailed knowledge of troop positions and a skilled technical team able to assess alleged violations.
The Redeployment Coordination Committee, which is comprised of an equal number of Huthi and Yemeni government military representatives, can lay out the ground rules.
The UN team will also need freedom of movement around Hodeida, something they have yet to achieve due to objections from the Huthis, who again cite security concerns.
Another core component of this process will be setting up a full monitoring mission. In December, the Security Council permitted the deployment of the initial assessment team and Guterres subsequently sent its members a proposal for the full mission, to be composed of up to 75 people.
A vote on a resolution approving his request is expected before 18 January. The UN will then need to hire monitors, deploy them to the field and work out how best to assess ceasefire compliance.
Finally, once all the preceding has happened, the UN will need to decide how to ensure accountability. Cammaert, who combines the roles of military coordinator, planner and monitor, reports to the secretary-general weekly.
Once rules are established and a monitoring mission is in place, he will be much better positioned to provide a fair assessment of what is happening on the ground.
His regular reports will make it easier to publicly hold the parties to account. The Huthis maintain that they have moved their main fighting forces out of Hodeida, Ras Issa and Salif ports.
In essence, these loopholes left the Huthis free to hand over the ports to themselves. Reaching an understanding on these matters is an urgent task.
Failure to do so would have the opposite effect. Getting there is likely to involve both a technical component, led by Cammaert, and a political aspect led by Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy who brokered the Stockholm Agreement.
Griffiths has sustained a punishing travel schedule as he meets with senior Huthi leaders, Yemeni government officials and coalition officials, extracting renewed commitments to the process.
The UN also needs to redraw the timelines for redeployments agreed upon in Sweden, which were set at 21 days from the announcement of the ceasefire, meaning that the deadline passed on 8 January.
Even before considering the animosity between the parties, this timeframe was unrealistic from a purely logistical point of view.
It will likely be up to Griffiths to get the Huthis and the government to agree to a schedule that acknowledges the urgency of the task at hand, but gives Cammaert a decent amount of time to carry it out.
To regain lost momentum, the focus for now should be on getting an agreement about genuine Huthi redeployments from the ports and putting it into practice.
In the end, it was reportedly a last-gasp phone call from James Mattis, then-US defense secretary, to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that pushed the deal over the line.
We now know that the U. But future pressure seems less likely now that Mattis is gone and that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who sees Yemen largely through the lens of countering Iran, is likely to take the lead on Yemen policy.
Both sides are likely to attempt to spoil the agreement. At this stage, however, the Huthis are the principal obstacle to progress.
For sceptical Yemenis, there are echoes of September events in how the Huthis have dealt with the Stockholm Agreement.
At that time, the Huthis had just overrun the capital, Sanaa, and other northern governorates. A similar outcome must be avoided at all costs, again raising the question of what tools diplomats have at their disposal to extract concessions from the Huthis.
The coalition argues, with some justification, that the Huthis relented in Sweden only because they were under military pressure around Hodeida. But turning up that pressure — a coalition invasion of the port and city — would come at an inordinate human cost.
There are other means of pressing the Huthis. An honest, public accounting of what is happening in Hodeida would be a good start. Cammaert is widely viewed as principled and highly capable, and his reporting to the UN secretary-general on redeployment negotiations and the monitoring mission will help cut through the media noise from the rival camps.
Such an accounting would put more pressure on the Huthis to comply with their commitments, as they would run the risk of seeing significant parts of international public opinion — which they have tried to use as a tool throughout the war — turn against them.
As Crisis Group has noted before, the EU and Oman have good contacts with the Huthis, and Iran has repeatedly offered to play a mediating role in Yemen.
Brussels and Muscat can also help by engaging with the Huthis in Sanaa and abroad, pressing the case for redeployments, and making clear that their patience is wearing thin.
In his most recent trip to Sanaa, Griffiths pushed Abdel-Malek al-Huthi, the rebel leader, to reiterate his commitment to the agreement, including redeployment.
While Cammaert hashes out technical details, such continued high-level pressure on Huthi, government and coalition officials to stick to their commitments will be important.
The Stockholm Agreement was the result of a confluence of events. These include the global outcry over the murder of the Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi in early October, triggering U.
Congressional action on Yemen, and the looming threat of all-out famine. Even then, what came out of Sweden had many flaws. To succeed, the Security Council members will need to avoid the terse, drawn-out negotiations between the UK and the U.
Crisis Group Yemen Update 2. A boy with a hunting rifle runs through the British Cemetery in central Baghdad during a sandstorm, March Executive Summary Beset by political dysfunction, endemic corruption and a jihadist threat, Iraq is squandering its greatest asset: Introduction Two years after the Islamic State IS captured major Sunni population centres, Iraqi government forces struggle to regain them in a multi-front war, supported by a U.
Hide Footnote Since the Iran-Iraq war in the s, however, youths have had neither normalcy nor a sense of progress.
Hide Footnote Before , the planning ministry was tasked with posting vacancies for each ministry and following up recruitment.
Hide Footnote Over time, these movements grew larger, more sectarian and more violent, engaging young members in a contest over ownership of the capital in particular.
Hide Footnote This policy gave Sunni insurgents and Shiite militiamen salaries and prospects of jobs as police or soldiers, but it also funnelled enormous resources to tribal figures who often pocketed them.
The Maliki Years From , the steady growth of oil production based on new contracts with companies such as BP and Shell gave Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his party sufficient money to buy social peace and project an illusion of stability.
Hide Footnote The revenue bonanza accelerated trends that had surfaced during the sanctions decade. Hide Footnote Education exemplified the vicious circle that directly affected youths.
Hide Footnote Private-school students have a greater chance to do well in exams. Hide Footnote After , we had to connect with the stronger parties to get money and weapons to protect our land and satisfy our members.
Hide Footnote My father was murdered in the sectarian war. Hide Footnote Those now in their late twenties participated in or saw the street fighting known as al-ahdath al-taefiya the sectarian events.
Hide Footnote Geographical isolation has nurtured sectarianism by locking youths within the boundaries of their community. Growing Anti-establishment Sentiment The degradation of state institutions nurtured feelings among youths of disdain toward political leaders.
Hide Footnote In Iraq, nowadays, all you need to be a successful politician are weapons and fighters. Mobilisation for Combat A. Hide Footnote Fifteen fighters entered the city.
Militia Commanders Return Something similar swept across the Shiite provinces. Hide Footnote The 10 June collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul exposed the dysfunction and corruption of the government and Shiite political leadership.
Hide Footnote We can no longer count on the army to defend this country. Volunteering to Fight Joining the hashd was the only way for many youths to earn a salary and benefits for their families if they died.
Hide Footnote It is likely that youths were driven by enthusiasm and the prospect of heroism, which circulated in their communities, more than by rational motives or religious belief.
Hide Footnote Young people were also attracted by the instant fulfilment, even martyrdom, the hashd offered, when no other prospects existed.
Genie Unleashed Neglected for a decade, youths unwittingly became the drivers of a political transformation that the political leadership was ill-equipped to ride or contain.
Hide Footnote They engaged in fundraising and redirected money from religious endowments and religious taxes khums to secure salaries for their fighters and benefits for the families of those killed in battle, who were deemed martyrs.
Hide Footnote Yet, overall, parties lack flexibility to reach large numbers of youths. Hide Footnote The Sadrist forces are poorly managed; defections are accelerating, and new militias acting independently from Sadr are appearing.
Disaffected Sunni Youth Mobilising youth became equally vital for Sunni provincial and tribal leaders intent on countering IS.
Hide Footnote In , I recruited more than 6, fighters and cleaned al-Doura [a Baghdad neighbourhood] of al-Qaeda. Hide Footnote On the other side of the front line, IS took advantage of the generational divide.
Hide Footnote The post-IS phase in Sunni areas will be especially challenging, because social hierarchies are developing under IS rule that are parallel with and disconnected from those in areas under government control.
Actually, a "generation" is the average time it takes for one child to produce a child. That means if you are 20 and have a child, that would be one "generation.
Since populations are getting older before they have their first child, the time for a "generation" is expanding also.
The average definition is years for genealogical purposes. Well, in the Bible it refers to all of mankind, in general, being a generation.
So in Biblical terms we are one generation. So it means we are the same, all of us, a generation. The entire race of Jews. As the word is used today it means a set of parents as a generation, and then their children a generation, etc.
It is also a term used to identify a group of same aged people. Also note that many word meanings have changed over the history of our world and words were used in different ways and meant different things at certain periods of history.
No, but I know why you are asking Salvation is a gift, Eph 2: Only if you are Christian. A generation goes like this.
Your grandmother is one generation, then your mom is the next, then you.. Jesus was resurrected 3 days after he was placed in the tomb, and the temple was destroyed, as he predicted, in 70 A.